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ABSTRACT Turkey is conducting an increasingly active energy diplomacy and 
in order to understand the role and strategies of Ankara in energy geo-
politics, it is important to apprehend Turkey’s behaviours at international 
level. In this respect, Turkey’s energy ties with international (energy) orga-
nizations have key importance. Hence, this paper seeks to analyze the en-
ergy relationship between Ankara and the BSEC. Turkey attends activities 
of the organization in order to increase its visibility at international level, 
become a leader in the Black Sea region, and boost its political and eco-
nomic ties with member states. However, due to the limited effectiveness 
of the organization in general and in the field of energy in particular, its 
contribution to the Turkish energy sector has remained modest.
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Introduction
Turkey has one of the largest energy markets in Europe. The significant growth in its economy, population, urbanization, and industrialization has recently caused a rapid increase in the energy demand of the coun-
try. The average annual increase rate in its energy need since 1990 is 4.6 per-
cent.1 The annual energy need of the country is envisaged to double in 10 years 
and to grow annually by 4.5 percent until 2030.2 Since the country does not 
have sufficient domestic energy resources to meet its energy demand, it has 
to import around 75 percent of its energy requirements. Turkey needs to im-
port around 98 percent and 90 percent of its gas and oil supplies, respectively. 
Although some volatility has been seen in the oil and gas imports parallel to 
the economic growth of the country, Turkey’s oil and gas imports have been 
increasing.
In 2016, Turkey’s total gas imports were 46,352 million cubic meters (Mcm), 
originating from Russia (52.94 percent), Iran (16.62 percent), Azerbaijan 
(13.98 percent), and other countries (16.45 percent).3 On the other hand, the 
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country imported 40,064 million tons 
of petroleum in the same year, mainly 
from Iraq (23.09 percent), Russia 
(19.38 percent), Iran (17.32 percent), 
and other suppliers (40.21 percent).4 
These numbers indicate that Turkey is 
highly dependent on Russia and Iran to 
meet its energy need.
Turkey’s external oil and natural gas 
strategy seeks to meet the increasing 
energy demand of the country, reduce 
its high reliance on a few suppliers, 
and turn the country into an energy 
hub between energy producing countries and European markets in order to 
enhance the significance of the country as a transit corridor in energy geo-
politics. Turkey tries to adopt an effective energy strategy in order to achieve 
these targets. In this regard, Turkey conducts an increasingly active energy di-
plomacy and augments its participation in regional and international (energy) 
organizations. 
There are numerous academic studies on Turkey’s energy strategy and bilat-
eral energy relations. These studies notably increased after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the emergence of new sovereign energy producing coun-
tries in the Caspian Sea, because these developments increased the possibility 
of importing energy resources of these new states to Turkey and to Europe 
via the Turkish territory. The existing academic studies emphasize that Tur-
key’s energy security concerns have increased as its energy need and imports 
have been growing.5 They also highlight the fact that Turkey has emerged 
as an important energy transit country, especially for European consumers 
and Caspian energy.6 Besides, the majority of the existing academic studies 
on Turkey also analyze bilateral energy relationships between Turkey and its 
energy partners such as Russia,7 Iran,8 and Central Asian countries.9 These 
studies point out a growing energy cooperation between Turkey and these 
suppliers. However, there are surprisingly no academic studies that analyze 
energy relations between Turkey and international (energy) institutions. Yet, 
the exploration of these relations is necessary in order to comprehensively 
apprehend some behaviors of the country in energy geopolitics as analyzing 
only its energy strategy and bilateral energy ties would not provide us with 
the complete picture of Turkey’s role and importance in global energy politics. 
Hence, this paper seeks to contribute to filling in this important gap in the ac-
ademic literature through analyzing Ankara’s energy relations with the Black 
Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). Considering the fact that the energy issue 
was one of the main drivers for Turkey to initiate the establishment of the 
Turkish leaders believe that 
the organization serves 
as a platform for regional 
cooperation that helps to 
increase stability, prosperity, 
and peace in the region. 
Thus, the country attaches 
significant importance to the 
organization
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BSEC in 1992 due the growing energy need of the country, the paper chose 
this organization. In this regard, it tries to understand what kind of energy 
relations Turkey has developed with the BSEC, how the BSEC contributes to 
the Turkish energy sector, to which degree and how Ankara supports energy 
activities of the BSEC, and to which extent energy issues stay as priority for 
Turkey in its ties with this organization. 
The paper addresses the subject in five steps. Firstly, it briefly gives background 
information about the BSEC. Secondly, it analyzes Turkey’s role and the extent 
of its participation in the BSEC. Thirdly, it covers the role and activities of the 
BSEC in the field of energy. Fourthly, it scrutinizes energy ties between Ankara 
and the BSEC. Finally, it concludes with an overview and assessment of the 
findings and provides a number of recommendations.
The BSEC
The BSEC covers a geography including the territories of the Black Sea lit-
toral states, the Balkans, and the Caucasus with an area of about 20 million 
square kilometres, represents a region of 335 million people, and reaches an 
intra-BSEC trade volume of $187 billion per year.10 The organization was es-
tablished by heads of states/governments of Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine 
in İstanbul in 1992. Its emergence was seen as a turning point in the regional 
cooperation process, signifying the first coherent indication of collaboration 
in the Black Sea region, which encouraged the regional players to integrate 
further.11 The BSEC is a political and economic initiative, which seeks to foster 
the interaction among its members and assure peace, stability, prosperity, and 
good-neighborly relations in the Black Sea region.12 Owing to the establish-
ment of the BSEC, the countries, which considered each other as rival due 
to the historical factors, obtained the opportunity of coming together to take 
a step in the process of economic collaboration.13 The BSEC “creed” was di-
rected by the notion that effective economic collaboration would also provide 
for growing mutual trust and wealth, which in turn, would augment the po-
tential for political partnership. Thus, despite mainly economic area of activity, 
the BSEC also obtained a major political significance, coming to address and 
handle hard sensitive security matters.14 
Agriculture, banking and finance, combating organized crime, culture, cus-
toms matters, education, energy, environmental protection, healthcare, infor-
mation and communication technologies, SMEs, tourism, trade, economic 
development, and transport are among the main areas of collaboration within 
the BSEC. The structure of the organization includes the Parliamentary As-
sembly, a Council of Foreign Ministers, a Permanent Secretariat, an Interna-
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tional Centre for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS), and a Trade and Development 
Bank (BSTDB). 
However, member states have until now concluded only a couple of manda-
tory deals and common sectoral action plans in the framework of the BSEC 
and in areas that originally lay outside its major focus. The organization is 
frequently criticized for lacking effectiveness and efficiency. The current de-
cision making process, where the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs is 
the main decision making authority for almost all subjects, has proven to be 
cumbersome and time-consuming.15 The decision-making procedure, which 
requires unanimity for all significant decisions, causes the BSEC to be a very 
uneasy format for regional collaboration, considering disputes and conflicts 
among BSEC members.16 In addition, the perceived weakness in the work of 
the BSEC institutional structures may occasionally be attributed to the low 
level of interest shown by national officials of member countries toward the or-
ganization. What is more, the Committee of Senior Officials, which frequently 
functions as a preventing factor to new proposals, is given an extreme weight 
of competences. The international secretariat of the organization, which has 
an unbelievably small number of professionals, does not have the necessary 
right to take initiatives and to carry out independent analyses, assessments 
and estimations. The BSEC has limited financial resources at its disposal.17 Ad-
ditionally, the non-existence of an operational mechanism to observe the im-
plementation of intergovernmental conventions, as well as of the resolutions, 
decisions, and recommendations adopted by the BSEC Council of Ministers 
seriously influences the efficacy of the BSEC, with negative consequences on 
its prestige and visibility.18 Moreover, the BSEC’s functioning shows the par-
ticular difficulties that its member states encounter, such as economic prob-
lems and little financial resources, security difficulties, and problems regarding 
state building. Furthermore, the heterogeneity of member states with regards 
to their size, economic development, security anxieties, and foreign policy 
preferences has therefore blurred the identity of the BSEC and the sense of 
common goals. This has also frequently led it to ‘paralysis.’19 It is a sad fact that 
member states frequently have incompatible interests and even clashing ones. 
This gives an explanation of their dissimilar anxieties, preferences, and stances, 
causing unclearly worded statements, resolutions, decisions, and recommen-
Ankara wants the organization to have 
stronger capability and better efficiency as 
an international organization and thereby 
encourages member states to work in order 
to achieve this
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dations that are eventually adopted, but sadly are equivalent to empty words 
of little result.20
Turkey and the BSEC
The BSEC was established with the initiation of Turkey’s former President Tur-
gut Özal. The primary incentive of Ankara was to create an atmosphere of 
cooperation based on economy in order to impede the likelihood of future 
conflicts in the Black Sea region.21 Moreover, Ankara sought to make Turkey 
a crucial player in developing the post-Soviet economic and diplomatic stan-
dards of the Black Sea, and thereby to become the region’s leader.22 In fact, 
Ankara’s objective was to fill the strategic gap after the disintegration of the 
USSR.23
The Black Sea is the world’s most isolated sea, linked to the rest of the world’s 
oceans solely through the two Turkish straits.24 Hence, Turkey has key impor-
tance with regards to accessibility of/to the region. In addition, Turkey has 
the longest shoreline of all the littoral states and hosts the secretariat of the 
organization. 
Turkey’s active participation in the BSEC enables the country to realize its 
foreign policy goals towards the region. Turkish leaders believe that the or-
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ganization serves as a platform for 
regional cooperation that helps to 
increase stability, prosperity, and 
peace in the region. Thus, the coun-
try attaches significant importance 
to the organization. In addition, 
through the BSEC, Ankara has de-
veloped political and economic 
relations with member states. For 
example, the BSEC provided an im-
portant platform where Turkey and 
Russia could gradually bolster their regional dialogue as well as bilateral eco-
nomic ties in the field of tourism, energy, and trade.25 
In the organization, Turkey is currently the country-coordinator of working 
groups on “Agriculture and Agro-Industry,” “Banking and Finance,” “Customs 
Matters,” “Information and Communication Technologies,” “Tourism,” “Trade 
and Economic Development,” “Transport,” and of the ad hoc working groups 
on “Massive Forest Fires” and “Floods and Torrents.” Besides, “Ad Hoc Work-
ing Group for Collaboration among BSEC Countries in Exploration and Ex-
ploitation of Hydrocarbon Resources of the Black Sea” was established with 
the initiative of Turkey. Moreover, Turkey, in addition to Greece and Russia, is 
one of the largest shareholders of the BSTDB with 16.5 percent stake.
In the course of Turkey’s latest chairmanship26 of the BSEC during January-June 
2017, the sectorial priorities of the country were agriculture and agro-industry, 
trade and economic development, strengthening the role of SMEs and sup-
porting inclusive businesses, banking and finance; energy, tourism and educa-
tion.27 In the context of its chairmanship, the country held several high-level 
meetings, including the 25th Anniversary Summit of BSEC in June 2017, with 
the participation of the heads of state and government of the BSEC member 
states. 
Ankara wants the organization to have stronger capability and better efficiency 
as an international organization and thereby encourages member states to 
work in order to achieve this. From the point of view of Turkish President Er-
doğan, the actual trade and investment volume among member states had not 
met its potential.28 In 1995, Black Sea countries accounted for only two percent 
of Turkey’s entire exports, while by 2008, that number was about 12 percent, 
the majority of which was conducted with Russia and Romania. But, in 2015, 
the trade with the Black Sea region had reduced to seven percent of Turkey’s 
entire trade.29 Additionally, in recent years, Turkey has growingly criticized 
the BSEC for delaying joint projects.30 This is why Erdoğan recently called on 
member states to become more active in the organization and participate more 
While the energy strategies 
of the BSEC members were in 
competition during the 1990s, 
the regional cooperation in 
the context of the BSEC has 
transformed this competition 
into collaboration
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in projects. He stated that “Of course, our wish is for each member state to 
undertake the coordination of at least one group… The more we lean toward 
the projects that address the daily lives of the people on our streets, the more 
we are on the right track.”31 Moreover, according to Erdoğan, the organization 
has to be utilized as a tool to settle problems by refraining from unproductive 
political debates32 given that political problems between some member states 
impede the organization from working effectively.
Energy Collaboration in the Framework of the BSEC
Energy was one of the key areas at which cooperation was aimed for during the 
establishment of the BSEC. The organization was founded with the aim of co-
operation that would enable Turkey to meet its energy needs and allow the So-
viet Union to meet their necessities for food and consumer products.33 Today, 
energy is still one of the key areas of cooperation among members and there is 
a good potential for collaboration, particularly for production and delivering 
oil and natural gas in the region. BSEC countries have the world’s largest oil 
and gas reserves after the Middle East.34 Russia and Azerbaijan are the major 
producing states of oil and natural gas in the region. Furthermore, searches for 
new oil and gas fields are carried out by all states in the region as there are signs 
of the presence of oil and gas fields in the Black Sea35 and in regions of Greece.36 
These resources are not solely a main, strategic asset but also an inevitable issue 
in bilateral and multilateral economic collaboration.37
The region has obtained much significance over the last two decades, as it has 
become host to alternative routes for the transportation of Caspian, Central 
Asian, and even Middle Eastern hydrocarbon resources to EU countries.38 
Turkey, Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, and Ukraine are already performing as 
energy corridors.39 
The BSEC’s key energy target is to “pursue convergence and cooperation of the 
national energy markets (including all kinds of energy sources –oil, natural gas 
and electricity) at the regional level in order to establish mutual advantages.”40 
It is considered that implementation of energy projects will provide enduring 
security and stability in the region. While the energy strategies of the BSEC 
members were in competition during the 1990s, the regional cooperation in 
the context of the BSEC has transformed this competition into collaboration. 
The actualization of the Blue Stream natural gas pipeline project between Tur-
key and Russia is an example of this change in the energy strategies of BSEC 
members.41 
Energy ministers of member states stress the necessity to focus on a number 
of areas, including energy efficiency, renewable energy, oil and gas transporta-
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tion, and creation of a Data Bank on energy programs.42 The statistics of secto-
rial meetings at ministerial and working group levels of the organization prove 
that until now the largest number was allotted to energy matters.43 
The BSEC has one Working Group on Energy, which deals with all relevant 
issues during its two-day meetings organized twice a year. The group covers 
various energy related issues such as energy security, environmental protec-
tion, energy efficiency, alternative and renewable sources, international co-
operation, and project development. The 2015-2017 action plan of the BSEC 
Working Group on Energy focuses on some priority spheres, namely exchange 
of information on legislation in energy sector and national programs, sustain-
able energy development, and development and improvement of energy infra-
structure in the Black Sea region.44
Additionally, the BSEC has started a process of setting up a BSEC Network for 
exchanging information and sharing experience and know-how among na-
tional administrative bodies and/or centers and organizations authorized to 
further energy sources and energy efficiency steps. Principal topics, which are 
being debated in this framework, include development of electrical intercon-
nections among members, collaboration in exploration and extraction of hy-
drocarbon resources of the Black Sea, promoting cross-border trade of natural 
gas in the region, and reinforcing the partnership between BSEC and other 
international institutions and agencies in the field of energy.45 
In addition, the Working Group on Energy commenced working for the elabo-
ration of a BSEC Green Energy Strategy Paper. A BSEC Green Energy Network 
was established in 2015 for exchanging information and sharing experience 
and know-how among national administrative institutions authorized to en-
courage renewable energy sources and energy efficiency steps and policies in 
the BSEC region.46 
Moreover, the BSTDB, the financial pillar of the BSEC which holds an autho-
rized capital of €3.45 billion and a subscribed capital of €2.29 billion,47 pro-
vides financial supports48 for the implementation of projects in several areas 
within the framework of the BSEC, including energy. According to the Bank, 
between 2000 and 2018, it disbursed over €248 million to projects in the field 
of energy.49 
As said above, the anticipations regarding the potential for energy to become a 
main driving force of regional collaboration have been high from the very be-
ginning of the organization. However, even though the discussions on energy 
have been quite active within the BSEC, the real consequences at regional level, 
apart from bilateral deals which are significant, have been frustrating.50 For 
instance, while an “Ad Hoc Working Group for Collaboration among BSEC 
Countries in Exploration and Exploitation of Hydrocarbon Resources of the 
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Black Sea” was established in 2007 and Turkey, Ro-
mania, Bulgaria, Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia cur-
rently conduct some energy exploration studies in 
the Black Sea, there is no considerable cooperation 
between them to jointly explore energy sources in 
the Black Sea. 
Five major factors have prevented a substantial en-
ergy collaboration among the BSEC members. First, 
there are some serious conflicts between member 
states such as Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Trans-
nistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, Russia-Ukraine cri-
sis, and Turkey-Armenia dispute. These conflicts 
impede members from carrying out considerable 
energy cooperation. Second, member states keep 
conducting bilateral energy collaboration instead 
of collaborating in the framework of the organization. Members believe that 
they can already conduct bilateral energy projects and therefore do not see the 
added value of cooperating on energy in the framework of the BSEC.51 Third, 
BSEC energy projects have been overambitious. The experience of the BSEC 
over the last two decades demonstrates that it might be logical to step back 
from the overambitious, and thus unrealistic, grand designs and concentrate 
instead on more practical and realizable measures.52 Four, due to the lack of 
an effective BSEC fund, projects are being carried out with national contribu-
tions. However, the size of such projects is quite small. Thus, overall concrete 
success of the BSEC in the sphere of energy has been rather limited. Finally, 
the general weakness in the effectiveness of the BSEC and difficulties in its 
decision making process have indispensably affected its activities and efficacy 
in the field of energy.
Turkey’s Energy Cooperation with the BSEC
In the establishment of the BSEC, Turkey principally sought to extend its 
economic impact in the post-Soviet region while facilitating its access to raw 
materials and energy resources.53 That is, energy was one of the key issues 
that encouraged Turkish leaders to push for the establishment of the BSEC. 
Today, energy is still one of Turkey’s important areas of interest in the frame-
work of the organization. Two BSEC members, namely Russia and Azerbai-
jan, are already Turkey’s main gas suppliers. In addition, Turkish authorities 
collaborate with Russia and Greece in order to send Russian gas to European 
markets. As explained before, Turkey aims to emerge as a transit hub between 
Caspian Sea energy sources and European consumers. In this regard, Tur-
key seeks to cooperate with BSEC states with the view of achieving this goal. 
According to 
Ankara, the strategic 
importance of the 
Black Sea region 
mainly stems from 
its location at the 
intersection of the 
major energy routes 
of Eurasia
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According to Ankara, the strategic importance of 
the Black Sea region mainly stems from its location 
at the intersection of the major energy routes of 
Eurasia.54 
During Turkey’s latest chairmanship, energy was 
one of the primary sectors of the country. In this 
regard, the country worked towards promoting ac-
tivities regarding energy security, green energy and 
sustainable energy development. Turkish officials 
also organized a round table meeting with the par-
ticipation of the energy regulation institutions of 
BSEC members in order to boost closer interaction and exchange in the area 
of energy regulation policies of member states. During the meeting, energy 
regulatory authorities agreed on developing collaboration on regulatory issues 
in a more systematic framework.55 
When meeting reports56 of the BSEC Working Group on Energy are analyzed, 
Turkey is obviously one of the most active countries in the group. During en-
ergy related gatherings, Turkish institutions share their experience and best 
practices on energy with BSEC members. Additionally, Turkey was the coun-
try-coordinator of the Working Group on Energy from July 1, 2013 until June 
30, 2015. Besides, as said before, the “Ad Hoc Working Group for Collabora-
tion among BSEC Countries in Exploration and Exploitation of Hydrocarbon 
Resources of the Black Sea” was established upon Turkey’s initiative. The first 
meeting of the group was held in Istanbul on September 7, 2007 and Turkey 
was selected as its country-coordinator. 
The BSEC membership has, to a certain extent, contributed to the Turkish en-
ergy sector. For instance, being one of the eleven founding members of the 
BSTDB, Turkey receives medium- and long-term loans for financing energy 
and infrastructure projects. As Figure 1 indicates, energy projects constitute 
3.6 percent of the total projects that have been financed by the BSTDB in Tur-
key from 2000 until 2018.
In the field of energy, some areas of the particular focus of the BSTDB in 
Turkey include development and rehabilitation of natural resource facilities, 
exploration and production of hydrocarbons both onshore and offshore, 
construction of new or rehabilitation of existing energy transportation infra-
structure, construction, upgrading, modernization, expansion, operation, and 
maintenance of all sorts of conventional and renewable energy and electricity 
capacities, and amelioration of energy efficiency, and conservation.57 In addi-
tion, in 2016 the BSTDB approved a loan amounting to $30 billion to Turkey 
Enerji A.Ş. (STEAS), a subsidiary of the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan 
Due to the limited 
effectiveness of the 
BSEC in the field of 
energy in general, 
its impact on the 
Turkish energy 
sector has so far 
stayed quite limited
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Republic (SOCAR), in order to help the STEAS obtain seven percent stake of 
the TANAP project. According to the Bank, the transaction is expected to sup-
port STEAS’s long-term policy of becoming a fully-integrated downstream oil 
and gas company in Turkey by benefiting from the country’s strategic location 
and important market increase potential.58
Figure 1: BSTDB’s Projects by Sector in Turkey between 2000-2018 (percentage)
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However, due to the limited effectiveness of the BSEC in the field of energy in 
general, its impact on the Turkish energy sector has so far stayed quite limited. 
Besides, although among BSEC members, Turkey is a leading country in the 
fiel  of nergy nd ncourages e ergy cooperation in the framework of the 
o ganization, Ankara does not cons der the BSEC as one of main organizations 
that could help it enhance its energy security. Turkey only shows increased 
interests in the Black Sea policies if any other big power intensifies its presence 
in the region, particularly through energy projects.59 Furthermore, despite the 
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fact that Turkey pushes for increased cooperation among member states in 
the area of energy, its main priorities in the context of the BSEC are trade and 
transport rather than energy. 
Assessment and Conclusion
With the view of adopting an effective energy strategy and enhance its stand-
ing in the global energy arena, Turkey carries out an increasingly active en-
ergy diplomacy. In this regard, Turkey attaches importance to works of mul-
tinational (energy) organizations, including the BSEC. Ankara has a number 
of drivers for attending activities of the BSEC. First and foremost, it aims to 
enhance its energy security as the BSEC can help the country to acquire best 
practices, know-how, technology, and rules, which can allow Ankara to em-
brace a more effective national energy strategy. Besides, the BSEC provides 
the country with financial support for carrying out energy projects, which 
help it to further benefit from its indigenous energy resources. Secondly, An-
kara seeks for strengthening capabilities of the national energy institutions 
via their active involvement in gatherings and activities of the BSEC. Thirdly, 
Turkey’s active engagement in BSEC activities enhances the visibility and in-
ternational standing of the country. Fourthly, during meetings of the BSEC, 
Ankara obtains the occasion of highlighting energy matters that are import-
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in a ministerial 
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ant for the country. Fifthly, energy 
collaboration in the context of the 
BSEC may occasionally provide 
Turkish (energy) firms with new 
markets for investment opportu-
nities. Last but not least, activities 
of the BSEC allow Turkey to keep 
communication channels open and 
cooperate with member states even 
if it might sometimes have strained 
bilateral relations with some of 
these states. This was particularly important when Turkey and Russia had 
tense relations as Turkish forces downed a Russian jet on Turkey’s border with 
Syria in 2015. After the crisis, the first contact between the two countries was 
made during a BSEC meeting. The Turkish Foreign Minister met his Rus-
sian counterpart on the sidelines of a BSEC foreign ministers meeting in the 
Russian resort of Sochi on July 1, 2016. This meeting was a significant step 
in the process of the restoration of friendly relations between the two coun-
tries after the crisis.60 Thus, open communication channels in the context of 
the BSEC enabled Ankara and Moscow to maintain their contacts in spite of 
their strained bilateral relations. Therefore, bilateral contacts in the context 
of the BSEC might, to a certain degree, allow Turkey and other members to 
smoothen their clashing positions in energy and/or other issues and continue 
their energy partnership. Consequently, overall, Turkey’s engagement with 
the BSEC has provided the country with important economic, political, and 
energy-related benefits. 
On the other hand, Ankara also contributes to works of the BSEC through 
actively participating in and hosting events of the organization, supporting it 
financially and hosting its headquarter. Turkey also shares its best practices in 
the field of energy with member states. 
Energy-related issues constitute one of the priorities of Ankara in its rela-
tionship with the BSEC, while other issues such as trade, transport, political 
and economic cooperation remain as Turkey’s preferences in its ties with this 
organization. However, the BSEC does not have substantial effectiveness in 
the field of energy, thus its overall influence on the Turkish energy sector has 
stayed quite modest.
Recommendations
In spite of its restrictions and shortcomings, the BSEC has so far stayed as the 
most inclusive scheme of cooperation having been designed in the region.61 
In order to augment the efficacy of the BSEC, the organization needs to estab-
lish a stronger sense of common goal among its members, to make member 
Activities of the BSEC allow 
Turkey to keep communication 
channels open and cooperate 
with member states even if it 
might sometimes have strained 
bilateral relations with some of 
these states
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countries consider that they have an 
interest in the organization. To suc-
ceed in establishing a unity of goals 
among member states, the BSEC 
has to concentrate its work on those 
fields where it has comparative ad-
vantages and where multilateral 
collaboration can provide added 
value.62 Besides, as stated above, 
the decision making process of the 
organization has been problematic 
and this makes it difficult to implement projects and achieve the goals of the 
organization. Thus, a new delegation of powers in the statutory bodies of the 
BSEC is necessary because the BSEC has set off to become more project-ori-
ented.63 Furthermore, effective and reliable decision making will strengthen 
the organization to enhance collaboration in concrete areas, where its action 
is still anaemic. Additionally, only if the BSEC is not hindered by procedural 
debates and administers the principles of good governance in its internal op-
eration, can it be a reliable actor in fostering prosperity and stability in the re-
gion.64 Moreover, it is significant to consider seriously the substantial increase 
of the BSEC operational budget in a multi-annual perspective on the basis of 
proportional contributions and to actively look for other sources of financing, 
including public-private partnerships.65
The BSEC can and has to be a means for increasing collaboration in the field 
of energy. Energy-rich countries, member states, main industrial economies, 
and multinational firms will need to combine their forces for the realization of 
energy projects in the framework of the BSEC. This will be a key, important 
investment towards lasting security and stability in the region.66 The organiza-
tion also has to focus the undertakings of the related ministerial meetings and 
working groups on those energy projects or area of common interest which 
can best profit from a trans-national, regional attitude and can result in con-
siderable consequences within a rational time frame in terms of economic 
rationality, cost-effectiveness, and accordance with accepted environmental 
standards.67 
The more the BSEC becomes an effective and powerful organization, the more 
Turkey can benefit from and support the organization. A more efficient BSEC 
can provide considerable and meaningful contribution not only to Turkey but 
also to the whole region and international community. Such a BSEC could 
boost stability, peace, and economic development in the region and enable 
the realization of concrete beneficial projects in all areas including energy. Of 
course, this would be helpful and significant for Turkey in general and for its 
energy sector in particular. 
Only if the BSEC is not hindered 
by procedural debates and 
administers the principles of 
good governance in its internal 
operation, can it be a reliable 
actor in fostering prosperity 
and stability in the region
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